IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 2007-CA-6641

WRIT NO.: 07-31

## EDWARD MIZO,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES,

Respondent.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Mary Varnadore, Hearing Officer.

Stuart I. Hyman, Esquire, for Petitioner.

Heather Rose Cramer, Assistant General Counsel, for Respondent.

Before LAUTEN, G. ADAMS, and THORPE, J.J.

PER CURIAM.

## FINAL ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Edward Mizo (Petitioner) timely filed this petition seeking certiorari review of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles' (Department) Final Order of License Suspension, sustaining the suspension of his driver's license pursuant to section 322.2615, Florida Statutes. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to sections 322.2615 and 322.31, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3).

On February 8, 2007, Trooper Brooks responded to the scene of an accident. Upon making contact with the driver, identified as Petitioner, Trooper Brooks observed that Petitioner's eyes were bloodshot and water, his speech was slow and slurred, and he had an orbital sway. Trooper Brooks also observed an odor of alcohol emitting from Petitioner. After Petitioner refused to perform field sobriety exercises, Trooper Brooks arrested Petitioner and transported him to the breath testing facility. Petitioner agreed to submit to a breath test and gave breath-alcohol samples of .166 and .169. As a result, the Department suspended Petitioner's driving privileges.

Pursuant to section 322.2615(6), Florida Statutes, Petitioner requested a formal review of his license suspension. On March 13, 2007, the hearing officer held a formal review hearing at which Petitioner was represented by counsel. Petitioner moved to invalidate the license suspension on four grounds: (1) the hearing officer failed to issue subpoenas for Roger Skipper, Laura Barfield, Kelly Melville, and Tanya Shrum; (2) the breath test machine was not approved for use in the State of Florida; (3) failure of the record to contain an agency inspection report for February or March; and (4) Petitioner was not identified as the driver. Petitioner also moved to strike the statements of any persons involved in the accident based on the accident report privilege. On May 18, 2007, the hearing officer entered an order denying Petitioner's motions and sustaining the suspension of his driver's license finding that the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that Petitioner was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances and that he had an unlawful breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher.

The Court's review of an administrative agency decision is governed by a three-part standard of review: (1) whether procedural due process was accorded; (2) whether the essential

requirements of the law were observed; and (3) whether the decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence. <u>City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant</u>, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982). "It is neither the function nor the prerogative of a circuit judge to reweigh evidence and make findings [of fact] when [undertaking] a review of a decision of an administrative forum." Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Allen, 539 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

In cases where the individual's license is suspended for an unlawful breath-alcohol level, "the hearing officer shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether sufficient cause exists to sustain, amend, or invalidate the suspension." § 322.2615(7), Fla. Stat. (2007). The hearing officer's scope of review is limited to the following issues:

- 1. Whether the law enforcement officer had probable cause to believe that the person whose license was suspended was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances.
- 2. Whether the person whose license was suspended had an unlawful blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or higher as provided in s. 316.193.

§ 322.2615(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007).

At issue in the instant case is whether the hearing officer departed from the essential requirements of the law in interpreting section 322.2615(6)(b) to prohibit the issuance of a subpoena for Kelly Melville, Roger Skipper, Laura Barfield, and Tanya Shrum. Petitioner argues that the hearing officer's failure to issue subpoenas violated his right to full discovery concerning the breath test machine upon which he was tested. He also asserts that the breath test results were inadmissible because the samples were obtained by using an unapproved and unreliable breath testing machine.

With respect to Petitioner's argument regarding the hearing officer's failure to issue subpoenas, the Department filed a motion to dismiss but reserved its right to respond pending the

Court's disposition of the motion. On August 22, 2007, this Court entered an order striking Argument I of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the basis that Argument I challenged the constitutionality of section 322.2615, as amended. Following the briefing phase of this appeal, Petitioner filed a notice of supplemental authority notifying the Court of the Second District's decision in Yankey v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 6 So. 3d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)(finding that when the department relies upon a document prepared by an agency inspector to properly validate the breath test results, section 322.2615, Florida Statutes, permits the driver to subpoena the inspector identified in that document), that addresses the issue raised in Argument I of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. After further reviewing Argument I of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this Court entered an order vacating the order of August 22, 2007, denying the Department's motion to dismiss, and striking one sentence in Argument I of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

With respect to Petitioner's other arguments, the Department contends that there is competent substantial evidence in the record that the Department substantially complied with FDLE rules to render Petitioner's breath test admissible.

In <u>Yankey</u>, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to quash a circuit court order affirming the department's suspension of her license for driving with an unlawful breath-alcohol level. 6 So. 3d at 634. The petitioner asserted that the hearing officer and the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in interpreting section 322.2615(6)(b), Florida Statutes, to prohibit the department's issuance of a subpoena for the agency inspector responsible for testing the breath test machine and signing the agency inspection report. <u>Id.</u> Pursuant to section 322.2615(6)(b), Florida Statutes, a driver in a formal review hearing "may subpoena those witnesses who are identified in documents submitted by the

arresting officer, which documents include the results of any breath test." Yankey, 6 So. 3d at 637; see also §622.2615(2), Fla. Stat. The Second District acknowledged that law enforcement had established a practice of routinely providing the department with a breath-alcohol analysis report, a breath test affidavit, and an agency inspection report, in order to report the results of the breath test and support the license suspension. Yankey, 6 So. 3d at 637. Based on the statutory and administrative code provisions regarding the procedures to establish the validity of breath test results, the Second District concluded that when an officer suspends a person's license and "submits breath test results pursuant to section 322.2615(2) that include the breath alcohol analysis report, a breath test affidavit, and an agency inspection report, and those documents identify specific persons, the hearing officer is authorized under section 322.2615(6)(b) to issue a subpoena to any person 'identified in' those documents." Id. at 638.

We find the <u>Yankey</u> decision to be dispositive of the instant case. <u>See Hendeles v.</u>

<u>Sanford Auto Auction, Inc.</u>, 364 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. 1978)(disposition of a case on appeal should be made in accord with the law in effect at the time of the appellate court's decision rather than the law in effect that the time the judgment appealed was rendered). Below, the Department entered the breath-alcohol test affidavit, the agency inspection report, and the department inspection report into evidence. The agency inspection report was completed by Kelly Melville and the department inspection report was completed by Roger Skipper. Like in <u>Yankey</u>, the hearing officer below refused to issue the subpoenas asserting that section 322.2615(6)(b), Florida Statutes, did not authorize him to do so.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the hearing officer was authorized under 322.2615(6)(b), Florida Statutes, to issue a subpoena to Kelly Melville and the hearing officer's failure to do so constituted a departure from the essential requirements of the law. In light of this

conclusion, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the additional arguments made by Petitioner and the Department.

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order has been arnished via U.S. mail to Stuart I. Hyman, Esquire, 1520 East Amelia Street, Orlando, Florida
2803 and <b>Heather Rose Cramer, Assistant General Counsel</b> , DHSMV-Legal Office, Post
,
Office Box 540609, Lake Worth, FL 33454-0609, on the4_ day ofMay,
010.
/S/
Judicial Assistant